A legal storm surrounds the High Court of Justice's ruling concerning Sami Abu Shehadeh. Professor Adam Shinar, a legal expert, has criticized the manner in which the Supreme Court managed the legal proceedings regarding the petition to disqualify Abu Shehadeh’s candidacy. In a conversation with hosts Gideon Oku and Amihai Attali on 103FM radio, Professor Shinar analyzed the internal complexity within the judicial panel and its implications for legal norms in Israel.
According to Shinar, the panel was likely divided between a majority of five judges who supported disqualification and a minority of four who opposed it. The complexity stemmed from the minority's refusal to write a judgment, a move intended to prevent a change in existing legal precedent. Professor Shinar expressed disappointment with this conduct, describing the court's actions as evasive. He emphasized that if the panel believes there is a basis for changing the prevailing precedent, it must do so explicitly and openly by issuing a reasoned judgment explaining the unique circumstances.
The downside of the current approach is a lack of legal clarity that leaves the public and political actors without clear guidance for the future. Responding to claims of political bias among the judges, Professor Shinar rejected the assertion that the institution is left-leaning, noting that a majority of judges on the panel expressed a willingness to disqualify the candidate. At the same time, Shinar addressed the impact of the public sentiment in Israel following the events of October 7th on the judges' ruling.
He assessed that it is difficult to ignore the general public and legal mood, which favored disqualification in this instance, contrary to the legal landscape of previous years. Regarding the conservative Supreme Court judges, Professor Shinar believes that Justices Stein and Mintz hold a more restrictive view regarding the right to vote and stand for election. He noted that the threshold they set from the outset was lower and that their position largely reflects the current national sentiment in the public, rather than being a result of momentary external pressures.
The practical significance of Professor Shinar's remarks concerns the importance of transparency and clarity in decisions of constitutional significance. When the court avoids detailed reasoning while changing precedents, it undermines the required legal certainty. For lawyers and jurists, the current case demonstrates the constant tension between exercising judicial discretion and the need to rely on precedents and past rulings, especially in sensitive cases touching the core of Israeli democracy.